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Public involvement in constitution making is increasingly considered to be 
essential for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process. It is also becoming 
more widespread, spurred on by constitutional advisors and the international 
community. Yet we have remarkably little empirical evidence of the impact of 
participation on outcomes. This essay examines hypotheses on the effect of one 
aspect of public participation in the constitution-making process—ratification—
and surveys available evidence. We find some limited support for the optimistic 
view about the impact of ratification on legitimacy, conflict, and constitutional 
endurance. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 1787, a small group consisting mostly of wealthy, 
property-holding white males gathered in Philadelphia to draft a written 
constitution for the United States, replacing the treaty-like Articles of 
Confederation.1 Believing that secrecy was necessary for reflection and 
 
1. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 2 (2001) 
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compromise, they did not invite the public either to observe or participate in 
their deliberations.2 When their handiwork was complete, they sent it on to the 
states for a more public ratification process, conducted by legislatures and 
specially formed constitutional conventions.3 This process has been called the 
invention of ratification.4 Notwithstanding periodic critiques of its suboptimal, 
and perhaps even antidemocratic, elements,5 the resulting document is widely 
venerated and seen by many Americans as central to the country’s enduring 
power and prosperity.6 It has spurred imitation by subsequent constitutional 
designers from Australia to Zambia.7 
Of the many innovations of the American Constitution, ratification is 
among the most important.8 Techniques vary, but an increasingly common 
approach is direct public involvement in approving the constitutional draft in an 
up or down vote.9 In France, for example, in 1795 a plebiscite ratified the French 
Constitution of the Year III.10 Ratification is part of a wider trend toward public 
participation. It is widely accepted that a representative, open process with direct 
public input is, on balance, good for setting the course for the democratic state.11 
Inspired by recent high-profile cases, such as South Africa in 1993, in which 
public consultation was extensive, scholars and practitioners have come to view a 
high level of popular participation as necessary for a constitution to be regarded 
as legitimate and relevant by the citizenry.12 Vivien Hart’s report, commissioned 
by the United States Institute of Peace, summarizes the prevailing view 
 
(noting small number of delegates and observing that many Framers were slaveholders); JACK N. 
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 11 
(1996) (recounting perceived necessity to replace Articles of Confederation). 
2. RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 13, 132. 
3. Id. at 102–08. 
4. Id. at 96–98. 
5. See DAHL, supra note 1, at 15–20 (noting that Constitution contained shortcomings when 
judged by later generations); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 9 (2006) 
(criticizing Constitution and calling for new constitutional convention). 
6. DAHL, supra note 1, at 122. 
7. See, e.g., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD: SELECTED ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5–9 (George Athan Billias ed., 1990) (examining influence of U.S. 
Constitution in different geographic regions); Franck Moderne, Human Rights and Postcolonial 
Constitutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 315, 332–34 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990) 
(discussing influence of U.S. Constitutional traditions on African countries and focusing on use of 
judicial review in Ghana and Zambia). 
8. RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 96. 
9. See infra Figure 2 for an overview of the proportion of constitutions providing public 
ratification procedures over the last 200 years. 
10. WILLIAM DOYLE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 319–20 (2d ed. 
2002). 
11. See Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
663, 668 (2006) (noting benefits of more participatory and inclusive constitution-building processes). 
12. Yash Ghai, Toward Inclusive and Participatory Constitution Making, Presentation at The 
Constitution Reform Process: Comparative Perspectives 7 (Aug. 3–5, 2004) (transcript available at 
http://www.idea.int/news/upload/Nepal%20-%20workshop%20paper%20-%20Yash%20Ghai.pdf). 
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succinctly: “[p]articipatory constitution making is today a fact of constitutional 
life as well as a good in itself.”13 
There are, of course, multiple aspects of the constitutional design process 
that deserve scrutiny, ranging from the sequence and organization of drafting 
stages, to internal rules of order, to the selection of the actors involved.14 Our 
focus here is on the degree of public involvement in approval of the constitution 
document. Drawing on our ongoing project to understand the causes and 
impacts of particular design choices in the creation of written constitutions, we 
ask whether more participatory approval processes produce systematically 
different types of constitutions than those with less public involvement.15 
Although available data are insufficient to answer many questions about 
participation and constitutional design, we provide some suggestive evidence 
here. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part II discusses the concept of 
participatory constitutional design in general and explores the variety of ways in 
which citizens can have input into the constitution-making process. Part III 
summarizes hypotheses from the existing literature about the relationship 
between ratification and the constitution that emerges from the process. Part IV 
tests some of these hypotheses and provides some preliminary empirical 
evidence. Part V concludes. We find that constitution-making processes with 
more extensive public involvement in ratification tend to produce documents 
with a wider role for the public in the selection of executive leaders, as well as 
more direct forms of participation. 
II. PARTICIPATORY CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
We can say that constitutional design is more participatory if the mass 
public has more opportunities by which to both oversee and engage in the 
process. Participation through oversight, through direct input, and through 
ratification differ conceptually, but we treat them all as contributing to a process 
in which the citizen is “involved” in some sense. It is not hard to imagine how 
citizens would be involved, as potential roles in constitution making have direct 
parallels to roles that citizens play under ordinary democratic conditions. 
Here we sketch the predominant forms of participation in order to provide 
some context. Others, notably Jennifer Widner, provide a comprehensive 
description of variation in the constitutional process.16 In Widner’s 
 
13. VIVIEN HART, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING 12 (2003). 
14. See generally PROCEEDINGS, WORKSHOP ON CONSTITUTION BUILDING PROCESSES, A JOINT 
PROJECT OF THE BOBST CENTER FOR PEACE & JUSTICE, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY-INTERPEACE-
INTERNATIONAL IDEA (May 2007), http://www.princeton.edu/bobst/docs/ 
Edited_Proceedings_1_(2).doc [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (discussing multiple aspects of 
constitution-building processes that require further investigation). 
15. Comparative Constitutions Project, http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2009). 
16. Jennifer Widner, Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1513, 1525 (2008). 
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conceptualization, the phases of constitution making include drafting, 
consultation, deliberation, adoption, and ratification.17 Actors involved can 
include members of expert commissions, legislative bodies or committees, the 
executive, the judiciary, national conferences, elite roundtables, transitional 
legislatures, specially elected constituent assemblies, interest groups and 
nongovernmental organizations, foreign advisors, and the public itself.18 Multiple 
insertion points thus exist for involving the citizenry in constitutional design 
processes. 
The modal form of participation in constitutional design is the power to 
ratify or approve the charter, usually by referendum on the final document as a 
whole.19 Clearly, this final step is limited in that it involves an up or down vote. 
As in day-to-day operation of direct democracy, citizens are voting for a highly 
circumscribed and aggregate d set of choices. Nevertheless, the frequency of 
ratification suggests that this dominant modality is even more common than 
other mechanisms of direct democracy.20 Because, in democratic theory, the 
people are sovereign, it is seen as necessary to have popular imprimatur on the 
founding document for the polity.21 
It is important to mention, however, that participation in constitutional 
design is increasingly more direct and penetrates more deeply—or at least 
earlier—in the process. One common approach is to involve the public in 
selecting those who will draft or deliberate over aspects of the charter.22 Such is 
the case if the group in question is a constituent assembly elected expressly for 
that purpose, or a regular legislature that takes on the project in addition to 
other duties. While the choice between a special constitutional assembly and a 
legislature may have profound implications for constitutional design,23 in either 
case the main deliberative body is selected by the public. We can thus presume 
some level of representation in the decisions that the deliberative body 
undertakes. 
Of the two models, the model of a special assembly appears to solve a 
problem of conflict of interest. The legislative model involves electing a 
legislature to accomplish ordinary governance tasks at the same time, so that 
 
17. Widner, supra note 16, at 1522. 
18. Id. at 1527–28. 
19. See id. at 1525 (noting that between 1987 and 2002, over half of constitution drafts were 
approved in deliberative bodies and nearly half of constitutions drafts were modified by public 
referenda). 
20. See generally THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 38–59 (1989) (recounting development of direct democracy in America). 
21. Lawrence G. Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 417, 
422 (1981) (noting that ratification process legitimizes Constitution as democratic in same way that 
legislative process legitimizes legislation). 
22. See Widner, supra note 16, at 1522 (noting that since 1987, delegates for constitution drafting 
were popularly elected in sixty-five percent of cases). 
23. See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 
380–81 (1995) (noting that ordinary legislature participating in constitution-making process will tend 
to “give preponderant importance to the legislative branch”). 
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choices about constitutional design are bundled with other concerns. 
Constitutional preferences may be traded off against other concerns in choosing 
a representative. In addition, there is a suspicion that legislators will aggrandize 
their own institution in designing a governance structure24 (although our 
preliminary review of the evidence suggests that this is decidedly not the case). 
In either case, however, the mode of public participation is decidedly indirect. 
Another mode of public participation involves direct consultation with the 
public or representative groups at various stages, which might occur before, 
during, or after the drafting of the initial text.25 The drafting phase would seem 
to be especially crucial, since we can expect a fair degree of inertia in the process. 
But the phase is also likely to be the least participatory, given the challenges of 
writing by committee, much less “writing by nation.” Indeed, in some well-
known cases, the public was excluded from the drafting process and not 
consulted at all.26 
But consultation can occur even if the drafting is monopolized by a 
relatively small group, and serves the function of providing information to 
decision makers about the preferences of the public while informing the public 
about possible outcomes.27 This allows correction if the current proposal or draft 
is wildly out of sync with expectations. Consultation also plays a legitimating 
role, at least when there is the appearance of listening to the views expressed.28 
 
24. Id.; cf. Yash Ghai & Guido Galli, Constitution Building Processes and Democratization, 2006 
INT’L IDEA 10 (noting that electing legislators to draft constitution may complicate process by 
providing one group with too much power); Kirsti Samuels, Constitution Building Processes and 
Democratization: A Discussion of Twelve Case Studies, 2006 INT’L IDEA 29 [hereinafter Samuels, 
Constitution Building Processes] (noting that less representative processes can lead to undemocratic 
retention of legislative power by particular groups); Samuels, supra note 11, at 668–69 (noting that 
where one interest dominates constitution-making process, it tends to entrench its own power). See 
generally Ghai, supra note 12, at 6–7 (describing role of various institutional actors in processes of 
constitutional change). 
25. Ghai & Galli, supra note 24, at 16; Ghai, supra note 12, at 5–6; see also Samuels, Constitution 
Building Processes, supra note 24, at 22–29 (discussing level of public participation in twelve 
constitution building processes); PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 19 (encouraging public participation 
before drafting initial text). 
26. In the case of Japan in 1946, a small group of American bureaucrats working for the 
occupation authorities drafted the initial text in a little under a week. RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. 
ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER 
MACARTHUR 106 (2002). Another common model utilizes “Round Table Talks,” used extensively in 
Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. JON ELSTER, CLAUS OFFE & ULRICH K. PREUSS, 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES 57 (1998). This is equivalent to constitutions 
produced in peace talks held as part of ongoing processes of conflict resolution. In these models, the 
fundamentals of the bargain are produced in negotiation among a small group of relevant actors, who 
may or may not be representative of the broader society but wield effective veto power over outcomes. 
27. See James Thuo Gathii, Popular Authorship and Constitution Making: Comparing and 
Contrasting the DRC and Kenya, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1117–18 (2008) (discussing Kenyan 
review team’s wide public consultation); Vivien Hart, Constitution-Making and the Transformation of 
Conflict, 26 PEACE & CHANGE 153, 160 (2001) (recognizing need for public participation in top-down 
process). 
28. See Widner, supra note 16, at 1519–20 (discussing consultative processes and their 
legitimatizing effects). 
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When it occurs, consultation can involve ordinary citizens, civil society 
groups, political parties, functional constituencies, or other segments of the 
population. A key variable here is not only who participates, but how effective 
such meetings are in terms of generating real input into the process. The hope is 
that consultation will provide direct substantive input into the constitutional 
draft, as opposed to relying exclusively on elites—however selected and however 
representative—to prepare the document. Still, consultation is a top-down, 
educative affair, in which elites reveal their deliberations to a larger public in an 
effort to solicit feedback and corroboration.29 Some constitutional processes 
have experimented with more bottom-up methods of direct democracy, such as 
the citizen initiative, in which ideas can bubble up from civil society.30 We cannot 
say much yet about the effect of such methods, although anecdotal accounts, 
such as the report that citizens submitted 61,000 proposals to Brazil’s Congress, 
suggest the magnitude of the challenges involved.31 
Finally, in some cases, participation and consultation are minimal, yet the 
public may exercise some oversight. In this mode, the public observes the 
process and product at various stages, without having direct input.32 The media 
can play an important role here, as can civil society organizations. Many 
constitutional debates, like ordinary legislative debates, are increasingly 
televised.33 If we believe that delegates will behave differently when facing the 
nation than they will when facing their colleagues (and a gallery), then such 
oversight can be consequential indeed. Evidence suggests, for example, that such 
delegates take the opportunity to express themselves in greater length or more 
often than they would otherwise.34 
One can think about all of these forms of public participation as a constraint 
on the adoption of institutions. Elster develops the useful distinction between 
“upstream” and “downstream” constraints in the process: upstream constraints 
are imposed by the powers setting up the constitution-drafting body, while 
 
29. See Samuels, Constitutional Building Processes, supra note 24, at 11–12, 15–16 (demonstrating 
elite solicitation of public feedback in Colombia, Guatemala, and Fiji’s constitution-building 
processes). 
30. See DEVRA C. MOEHLER, DISTRUSTING DEMOCRATS: OUTCOMES OF PARTICIPATORY 
CONSTITUTION MAKING 28–32 (2008) (identifying examples of constitution-making processes 
incorporating input derived from public participation). 
31. Jamal Benomar, Constitution-Making After Conflict: Lessons for Iraq, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 81, 
89 (2004); see also MOEHLER, supra note 30, at 57 (discussing submission of over 25,000 suggestions 
from Ugandan public during constitution-making process). 
32. Widner, supra note 16, at 1524–25. 
33. See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, Challenging Political Boundaries in Post-Conflict States, 29 U. PA. 
J. INT’L L. 105, 126 (2007) (discussing televised meeting presenting draft Rwandan constitution); 
Martha I. Morgan, Founding Mothers: Women’s Voices and Stories in the 1987 Nicaraguan 
Constitution, 70 B.U. L. REV. 1, 58 n.239 (1990) (noting that televised debates were held in Nicaragua 
about draft constitution). 
34. See generally Franklin G. Mixon Jr., David L. Hobson & Kamal P. Upadhyaya, Gavel-to-
Gavel Congressional Television Coverage as Political Advertising: The Impact of C-SPAN on 
Legislative Sessions, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 351 (2001) (examining television’s effect on increasing 
legislative session length). 
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downstream constraints result from the anticipation of final-stage gatekeepers.35 
Ratification is, thus, a downstream constraint that can hamstring leaders in an 
earlier stage who recognize that their document must ultimately obtain public 
approval. Although only one of many points in the process in which public 
participation can be realized, it is the key point, and can have significant impact 
on upstream processes of constitutional design. 
III. PARTICIPATION, CONSTITUTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY: SOME HYPOTHESES 
Public involvement in constitutional design shares many of the 
characteristics, vices, and virtues that scholars ascribe to participation more 
generally. Participation has both costs and benefits, and in this Part we survey 
some of the general claims in the literature about the effects of participation in 
order to consider possible impacts in the constitutional setting. We consider 
effects on the system as a whole (that is, broad political and economic 
outcomes), effects on the citizenry, and effects on the constitution itself. As in so 
many areas of social science, the hypotheses about participation in constitution 
making are informed by deeper views about human motivation and the nature of 
social institutions.36 
A. System-Level Effects 
One prominent view highlighting the virtues of participation for democratic 
governance is associated with deliberative democracy.37 Deliberative democracy 
theorists focus on the benefits of deliberation, consultation, and citizen 
involvement in government.38 In this view, participation is not only a device to 
aggregate pre-existing preferences, but an opportunity to generate new ideas and 
institutions in the process.39 Participation is said to “facilitate[] the flow of 
reliable information so that resulting policies are high quality, appropriate to 
circumstances, and congruent with citizen preferences.”40 Deliberation is at the 
 
35. Elster, supra note 23, at 373. 
36. See Robert H. Salisbury, Research on Political Participation, 19 AM. J. POL. SCI. 323, 323–24 
(1975) (examining behavior in political participation). 
37. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287–328 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (discussing deliberative 
politics as key element of democracy); MOEHLER, supra note 30, at 182–85 (discussing effects of 
participation generally and as related to Ugandan constitution-building process); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY 6–8 (2001) (encouraging constitutional promotion of deliberative 
democracy). 
38. See generally DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 
(Stephen Macedo ed., 1999) (discussing value of deliberative democracy); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS 
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996) (examining deliberation in democracies in 
light of moral disagreement); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD 
POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989) (discussing 
ideal deliberative democracy as one that promotes the common good and respects individual 
autonomy).  
39. MOEHLER, supra note 30, at 185. 
40. Id. at 13. 
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center of normative ideas about ideal democracy, and naturally is to be 
celebrated when considering the fundamental rules of a polity.41 From this 
perspective, ratification is probably an insufficient instrument of engaging the 
public.42 An up or down vote comes too late in the process to have a real impact, 
and the benefits of wide discussion cannot be included in the text if such 
discussion occurs after drafting. 
Some scholars are more skeptical about the potential of deliberative 
democracy to really work, given the qualifications of citizens. Arguably, 
participation requires that citizens be capable of both moral reasoning43 and 
basic social scientific reasoning.44 We know an enormous amount about the 
limits of citizen competence, and what we know does not give us reason to be 
optimistic about the value of their contribution.45 We also have reason to 
question citizen moral reasoning if we believe that they differ from elites with 
regard to their motivations. Some have suggested that citizens, to a greater 
degree than elites, are motivated more by self-interest than by ideals of 
community and good governance.46 In this sense, participation may be 
instrumental, providing citizens an additional avenue to capture state benefits, 
protect interests, or gain power. Rather than promoting civil society and building 
democratic citizens, such self-interested participation may have the opposite 
effect.47 These views are obviously more skeptical about the possibility of 
deliberation and the value of participation. From this point of view, limiting 
participation to an up or down ratification might be useful to achieve some 
legitimating benefits without sacrificing the content of the constitutions. 
A related school associated with public choice economics is less skeptical 
about the value of participation, but more skeptical about the probability that it 
will occur.48 Even when presented with opportunities to participate in 
deliberative and policy-making processes, most members of the public may 
 
41. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 12 (describing deliberation as integral part of 
republican government).  
42. See Ghai & Galli, supra note 24, at 16 (discussing necessity of continuous public engagement 
in constitution-making process); John M. Carey, Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions, 33 COMP. 
POL. STUD. 735, 753 (2000) (discussing Russian constitutional failure after ratification in which there 
was no deliberation). 
43. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 6 (1971). 
44. Sidney Verba, Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn Out to Be a Nightmare?, 1 PERSP. 
ON POL. 663, 668 (2003). 
45. See generally Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY 
AND DISCONTENT 206 (David E. Apter ed., 1964) (arguing that citizens often lack coherent belief 
systems). For a contrary view arguing that the public can make reasoned political decisions, see 
generally ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS 
LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998).  
46. See, e.g., THOMAS R. CUSACK, A NATIONAL CHALLENGE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: CITIZENS, 
ELITES AND INSTITUTIONS IN REUNIFIED GERMANY 91–93 (2003) (explaining that individuals with 
less human capital would tend to act with self-interest in choosing their governmental system). 
47. Ghai & Galli, supra note 24, at 16. 
48. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and 
Theory in Legal Scholarship, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139, 1140–48 (describing public choice theory). 
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remain rationally ignorant, given the investment required to become informed 
about issues and the relatively small share of gains any individual will enjoy.49 
Those most likely to exercise voice are those with the most at stake, and so it is 
easy to see how interest group activity can overwhelm public-minded 
principles.50 Of course, these arguments have always been embarrassed by rates 
of voter turnout that defy expectations.51 Advocates of the rational model reply 
that voting is almost costless, such that even the negligible benefits of voting are 
enough to push citizens to the ballot box.52 Some of the more costly modes of 
participation in constitutional design, however, would attract few takers. But the 
benefits of participation may also soar during times of “high politics” such as 
constitutional design.53 The high stakes of constitutional politics may be more 
likely to induce rational participation than would those in the ordinary legislative 
sphere in which these ideas were developed and most often applied.54 Thus, one 
should expect that problems of capture by narrow interest groups will be 
relatively less severe in the constitutional setting, while not being eliminated 
entirely.55 In Elster’s terms, interest will be balanced with passion and reason.56 
B. Effects on Citizens 
Another set of claims focuses on the effects of participation on the 
citizenry.57 Participation conceivably inculcates democratic skills, habits, and 
values such as trust, tolerance, and efficacy—attributes that may be good in 
themselves but that may also trickle up to provide system-level benefits.58 
Mansbridge summarizes the view, and empirical support for it, thusly: 
“[p]articipation does make better citizens. I believe it, but I can’t prove it. And 
 
49. Id. at 1146. 
50. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (1971). 
51. Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2137 (1996). 
52. Gordon Tullock, Some Further Thoughts on Voting, 104 PUB. CHOICE 181, 181 (2000). See 
generally John H. Aldrich, When Is It Rational to Vote?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 373 
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (examining theories of rationality of voting). 
53. See Aldrich, supra note 52, at 374 (noting that voter turnout is higher in elections with greater 
political stakes). 
54. Bruno S. Frey, Economic Policy by Constitutional Contract, 32 KYKLOS 307, 317 (1979). See 
generally Ginsburg, supra note 47 (criticizing and revising public choice theory). 
55. See, e.g., Jane Mansbridge, Does Participation Make Better Citizens?, GOOD SOC’Y, Spring 
1995, at 1, 1 (arguing that participation in politics makes better citizens), available at 
http://www.cpn.org/crm/contemporary/participation.html. 
56. Elster, supra note 23, at 377–86.  
57. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A 
NEW AGE, at xv (1984) (arguing that “democracy is the condition of autonomy” and that people 
cannot become individuals “[w]ithout participating in the common life that defines them”). 
58. Id. at 152 (stating that participation strengthens democratic institutions); CAROLE PATEMAN, 
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 42–43 (1970) (arguing that participation makes 
democracy self-sustaining); Mansbridge, supra note 55, at 1 (noting positive impact of participation on 
citizen character). 
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neither can anyone else.”59 The act of participation also serves to educate 
citizens on matters of public import, accelerating the acquisition of political 
information and equipping citizens to evaluate their government more 
critically.60 This in turn may lead to better quality and more legitimate policies. 
In the constitutional setting, this argument suggests that participation in 
ratification promotes democratic values in citizens and educates them in the 
operations of democratic processes as well as the contents of the constitution.61 
This may increase the likelihood of the success of democracy at the regime level. 
Thus participation in the constitutional approval process will carry over to 
governance under the constitution once adopted. 
A more skeptical view is implicit in an older line of theory concerned about 
the universality of the participation model.62 Rather than enhancing democracy, 
participation can undermine it in some contexts, particularly if participation 
expands beyond the scope of elites.63 In this view, the average citizen is ill 
informed and can be easily deceived by opportunistic politicians upon his or her 
entry into the public sphere.64 In addition, mass participation may overwhelm 
the institutional capacity of some states to effectively channel mass political 
activities through legal avenues.65 The threat of instability and disorder is 
deemed too high to risk widespread popular participation.66 Introducing highly 
participatory processes in premodern societies may exacerbate conflicts among 
citizens over resources, identity, or other societal cleavages.67 This could 
ultimately prevent a constitution from emerging, or hinder its operation once 
adopted, through the intermediate effect on citizens. 
C. Effects on the Constitution 
Will constitutions produced through participatory processes be 
systematically different from other constitutions? Stefan Voigt voices a practical 
concern related to the consequences of participatory constitutional design 
 
59. Mansbridge, supra note 55, at 1.  
60. Id. at 5–6.  
61. See generally BARBER, supra note 57, at 135 (arguing that in “strong democracy” political 
conflicts result in civil education). 
62. See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 97–99 
(1960) (recounting examples where mass participation of middle class citizens resulted in extreme and 
intolerant movements). 
63. See id. at 122 (observing that when lower classes endorse extremist party, liberty might be 
sacrificed for promise of equality and economic security). 
64. Id. at 97–99. 
65. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 4 (1968) 
(noting that “rapid mobilization of new groups into politics” produced “violence and instability” in 
some nations).  
66. See id. at 1–6 (correlating political instability with mass participation in political process).  
67. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 
and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 91 (1959) (suggesting that conditions common to 
modern societies moderate conflict). 
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processes for textual coherence.68 As Donald Horowitz notes, even under the 
best of circumstances, constitutional “design”—a term he reserves for a cohesive 
process—is quite rare, with some process of incremental construction more the 
norm.69 Constitution making frequently consists of a combination of institutional 
borrowing, wholesale grafting, log-rolling, and improvisation.70 As new, and 
more, actors become involved in the process, bargaining and negotiation become 
both more extensive and intensive.71 In addition, the populace may be subject to 
cascades that exacerbate the element of “passion” in constitutional design.72 The 
constitution that emerges from this process will almost certainly be an ad hoc 
creation, rife with internal inconsistencies and institutional mismatches. While 
the loss of design consistency may be compensated for by the resultant gains in 
legitimacy,73 it may also render the constitutional scheme unworkable. 
Additionally, simply increasing the number of actors is no guarantee of a more 
equitable outcome. The composition of a deliberative body is as important to the 
ultimate outcome as the number of members; extreme outcomes can emerge 
from a collective decision-making process.74 
A different line of critique emphasizes the difficulty of reaching agreement. 
More actors will, ceteris paribus, increase the transaction costs of negotiation, 
particularly when participants have veto powers over the adoption of new 
rules.75 A more open process can also make bargaining and the granting of 
concessions more difficult.76 This is in part because the drafters will feel the need 
to signal positions to their constituents outside the process, potentially leading to 
more extreme positions.77 The drafters may also be interested in using the 
bargaining process to grandstand, decreasing the possibility of agreement. Open 
 
68. See Stefan Voigt, The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice — 
Towards a Comparative Analysis, in DELIBERATION AND DECISION: ECONOMICS, CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 199, 219–20 (Anne van Aaken et al. eds., 2004) (arguing 
that increased public participation in constitution drafting can lead to more conflicting interests being 
represented and thus less overall document consistency than would be produced by homogeneous 
group of drafters). 
69. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes, in THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND 
DEMOCRACY 15, 16–18 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002). 
70. Id. 
71. See id. at 15–18, 35–36 (suggesting that participation requires concessions and bargains 
resulting in “constructed” rather than “designed” constitutions). 
72. See Elster, supra note 23, at 382–84 (discussing role of “passion” in constitutional design). 
73. Horowitz, supra note 69, at 36. 
74. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 36–37 (noting that groups of people can reach highly 
polarized positions in public institutions). 
75. See generally GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 17–
63 (2002) (discussing inverse relationship between number and diversity of participants who have 
ability to veto change and likelihood of changing current policy). 
76. Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 191, 225 (1995); see also Elster, supra note 23, at 388 (stating that public process impedes genuine 
discussion). 
77. See Elster, supra note 23, at 388 (noting potential for “overbidding” and “grandstanding” in 
public debate context). 
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processes of negotiation will tend to hinder tough choices and compromise.78 
Public ratification has two potential impacts here. First, it can constrain upstream 
actors, who will not want to include particular institutional choices that may be 
controversial.79 On the other hand, the public itself might be constrained by the 
very knowledge that producing an agreement was so difficult.80 Knowing that a 
rejection will send the drafters back to the drawing board can, perversely, 
encourage the public to ratify a suboptimal document. 
One of the strongest theoretical claims about popular participation concerns 
a constitution’s ability to constrain government. If citizens are to effectively 
police the actions of government, it must be sufficiently clear what constitutes a 
violation of the limits of governmental power so that citizens can mobilize to 
prevent it.81 Constitutions help resolve this coordination problem by generating 
common knowledge about the scope of acceptable government behavior and by 
providing a focal point for citizens to coordinate enforcement efforts.82 To the 
extent that popular ratification of a constitutional design process serves to 
construct focal points, it will facilitate the coordination needed to deter potential 
constitutional violations by government. In the most optimistic scenario, the 
presence of a focal point in the written text, when coupled with the more robust 
civil society that emerged as part of a participatory design process, will ensure 
that the constitution will be enforced and not serve as a mere parchment 
barrier.83 
Voigt develops a set of hypotheses relating inclusive participation to 
substantive outcomes.84 He suggests that inclusive processes will lead drafters to 
create more independent bodies, delegating powers away from the legislature.85 
This is a corollary, of sorts, to the prediction that the legislative model will 
concentrate powers in the legislature.86 Voigt also believes that participatory 
documents will be more stable, in that there will be fewer demands for 
renegotiation down the road.87 He also shares the view that participation in a 
 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 374. 
80. See id. at 373–75 (discussing impact of downstream constraints on decision making in context 
of ratification by entity or institution). 
81. Carey, supra note 42, at 749. 
82. Id.; see also Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 
91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 246–51 (1997) (developing game theory model to explain how citizens 
assert their rights against their representatives). 
83. Carey, supra note 42, at 749. 
84. Voigt, supra note 68, at 217–24. 
85. Id. at 219. 
86. Elster, supra note 23, at 380; see also SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED 
NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING 141 n.52 (2004) (noting that, after 
East Timor mandated legislative assembly to define scope of its own powers, legislature granted itself 
broad powers). 
87. Voigt, supra note 68, at 220. 
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ratification process should lead to more legitimate documents because the 
process will generate and reinforce public knowledge of the contents.88 
We might also speculate on further implications for constitutional design. 
One influential view of constitutions conceives of them as a social contract 
among the citizenry, designed to limit the threat from government.89 In this view, 
one would expect that more participatory processes work like supermajority 
rules. As the veto power of minorities increases, one might expect the adoption 
of more minoritarian institutions, such as judicial review,90 bicameralism, and, 
assuming that relevant cleavages are geographically concentrated, federalism. 
Supermajoritarian processes might produce supermajoritarian rules and 
institutional configurations, to the extent that a rule-making body will produce 
others in its likeness. 
We might also expect that as the power of the citizenry in design processes 
increases, the number and extent of constitutional rights will increase as well. 
The American case, in which the Bill of Rights was inserted only after public 
discussion and debate, makes the point quite dramatically.91 The Anti-
Federalists wanted to include a bill of rights in the original bargain, and were 
able to gain agreement on this during the ratification process as a condition of 
approval.92 Participation, then, begat a more extensive set of limitations on 
federal power. In more recent examples, we might expect that participation 
would be associated with “positive” socioeconomic rights, as the constitution 
becomes an instrument of redistribution.93 
A related point is that participation may also lead to more specific and 
detailed constitutional documents.94 Analogizing to contracts literature, more 
diverse parties are likely to want to specify their bargain in greater detail because 
of distrust of counterparties and concerns about strategic nondisclosure of 
preferences during the bargaining process.95 Thailand’s 1997 document, for 
example, was designed to limit political institutions by setting up a large number 
 
88. Id. at 221–22 (hypothesizing that regime will possess higher level of legitimacy if large part of 
population can participate in rule-creation process). 
89. Christine Sypnowich, Ruling or Overruled? The People, Rights and Democracy, 27 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 757, 759 (2007) (asserting that social contract theory is common view of constitutional 
interpretation). 
90. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ASIAN CASES 25–30 (2003). 
91. Arato, supra note 76, at 225. 
92. See RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 325–28 (examining Anti-Federalist role in adoption of U.S. Bill 
of Rights). 
93. See HART, supra note 27, at 168–69 (discussing subclauses of South Africa’s Article 25 
allowing state to redistribute land in order to accomplish “restitution of property dispossessed by 
racially discriminatory practices”). 
94. Stefan Voigt, Explaining Constitutional Garrulity 9–10 (Oct. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1021023. 
95. Id. at 11. 
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of watchdogs, all elaborated in excruciating detail in the constitution.96 Similarly, 
if the public perceives opportunities for participation to be episodic, there may 
also be a tendency to seek to constitutionalize various institutions that would 
ordinarily be left to nonconstitutional politics. An example here is Brazil, whose 
1988 process involved extensive citizen proposals on content.97 The resulting 
document is one of the world’s longest.98 
D. Summary of Hypotheses 
To summarize these various claims about public constitutional design, we 
see a number of contradictory hypotheses. Participation in constitutional design 
has been hypothesized to destabilize fragile societies either by exacerbating 
conflicts over resources, activating latent identities such as ethnicity, or both.99 
Some have suggested participation will produce documents dominated by self-
interest, while others believe it will maximize the common good by providing a 
more representative sample of interests and a deliberative process.100 Skeptics 
believe that it will make agreement more difficult and lead to incoherent 
documents, which implies that actors will seek to embed their preferences in the 
constitution, but others believe that participation will fail to materialize in any 
meaningful way, as citizens will have insufficient incentives to contribute their 
views.101 Optimists, on the other hand, believe that the documents produced by 
 
96. See James Ockey, Change and Continuity in the Thai Political Party System, 43 ASIAN SURV. 
663, 667 (2003) (discussing Thailand’s 1997 constitutional provisions establishing numerous monitoring 
institutions). 
97. Benomar, supra note 31, at 89. 
98. See Andrea Steuer Zago & Lionel Pimentel Nobre, The Brazilian Citizen Constitution, the 
Environment and Taxation, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 507, 508 (1998). 
99. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 65, at 32–39 (describing how group consciousness can serve as 
obstacle to creation of strong political institutions); Robert Melson & Howard Wolpe, Modernization 
and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1112, 1120–21 
(1970) (asserting that groups lacking power will question legitimacy of political order). But see Lipset, 
supra note 67, at 91–98 (noting that although intergroup conflict can lead to societal disintegration, 
social cleavages strengthen democratic institutions). 
100. See Salisbury, supra note 36, at 335 (analyzing empirical and survey work indicating that 
increased participation by group leads to greater societal harmony). But see Steven E. Finkel, The 
Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support: Evidence from a West German 
Panel, 49 J. POL. 441, 461 (1987) (concluding that voting engenders positive feelings toward ruling 
regime and that “[v]oting is not a means of personal empowerment”). See generally Lawrence A. Scaff, 
Two Concepts of Political Participation, 28 W. POL. Q. 447, 450–51 (1975) (observing that one concept 
of political participation emphasizes common good while another stresses advancing one’s individual 
interests within political framework). 
101. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 15 (indicating that deliberation within small groups of like-
minded individuals can threaten social stability and lead to more extreme views within group); Arato, 
supra note 76, at 207 (describing detrimental effects of constituent power during French Revolution); 
Elster, supra note 23, at 377–82 (explaining how personal, group, and institutional interests affect 
constitution-making); Horowitz, supra note 69, at 26 (noting constitutional actors and ethnic groups 
favor and disfavor certain constitutional approaches, which can result in document containing 
elements from various methods); Salisbury, supra note 36, at 327 (analyzing instrumental perspective 
of political participation and its view that participation is means of enhancing one’s personal or one’s 
group benefits). 
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participatory processes will be more legitimate and effective and will lead to a 
better-informed citizenry with democratic habits, skills, and values, thus 
enhancing democratic performance in the postconstitutional period.102 Finally, 
optimistic scholars think participatory processes will include more rights 
provisions and better enforcement mechanisms to protect them, including 
supermajoritarian institutions, and more public involvement in selecting 
government agents.103 
As is readily apparent, even this partial list of hypotheses generated from 
the existing literature is expansive and internally contradictory. Some of the 
hypotheses posit long-term, remote outcomes, while others are directly related 
to the immediate product of the process—the constitution. Most are 
straightforward empirical questions, testable using appropriate data, and in the 
next Part we will consider evidence for some of the hypotheses. 
IV. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PARTICIPATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
PROCESSES 
We reiterate that despite the current optimism about the merits of 
participation, we have very little general knowledge about the patterns and 
effects of participation. In this Part, we report some results from the 
Comparative Constitutions Project (“CCP”) that bear on the question of 
constitutional design. We draw on a sample of 413 constitutional cases for which 
we have data available, as part of our ongoing effort to map the world’s 
constitutional texts.104 
 
102. See PATEMAN, supra note 58, at 42–43 (highlighting educative impact of participatory 
process); Samuels, Constitution Building Processes, supra note 24, at 29 (concluding that more 
participatory processes provide opportunity for greater democratic education of population); Steven 
E. Finkel, Can Democracy Be Taught?, 14 J. DEMOC. 137, 140–41 (2003) (asserting that civic education 
increases political participation and “bolster[s] the core democratic orientations of political efficacy 
and tolerance” based on study of adult civic education programs in three countries); Finkel, supra note 
100, at 443 (noting that some scholars hypothesize that participation in political process will increase 
government’s legitimacy in eyes of participants); Mansbridge, supra note 55, at 1 (concluding that 
“participation in democratic decisions positively affects citizen character” while admitting that such 
changes in character are difficult to measure); Samuels, supra note 11, at 665–66 (stating that 
participatory democratic structures “ensure peace and legitimacy”); Scaff, supra note 100, at 452 
(noting Rousseau theorized that greater public participation leads to more legitimate government and 
freedom). But see MOEHLER, supra note 30, at 182–85 (concluding that participation in Ugandan 
constitution making “contributed to a decline in institutional trust” and “did not significantly enhance 
feelings of political capability”); Devra C. Moehler, Participation and Support for the Constitution in 
Uganda, 44 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 275, 276 (2006) (claiming citizens active in constitution-making 
process are no more assertive than those who stayed at home). 
103. Samuels, supra note 11, at 668; see also Samuels, Constitution Building Processes, supra note 
24, at 4–5 (asserting that inclusive processes result in constitutional drafts that provide more rights to 
previously neglected groups). 
104. We have currently identified 801 total constitutional systems for all countries since 1789, but 
not all of these documents have been coded in our project at this stage. 
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A. Descriptive Patterns 
Our information on promulgation comes largely from within the 
constitutional texts themselves. Not every such document provides details on its 
promulgation, but more than eighty percent do so. As Figure 1 demonstrates, 
there is a trend toward explicit elaboration of the means of promulgation in 
constitutional texts. This information was supplemented or confirmed through 
several outside sources.105 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of Constitutions in Force That  
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Several different methods have been used to promulgate constitutions. The 
basic choices include promulgation by a specially constituted constituent 
assembly, a legislature, the executive, or the public through a referendum of 
some kind.106 There are various combinations of these methods as well, and we 
identify forty-five different methods used to promulgate constitutional texts, 
though seventy percent of cases use one of six major methods.107 Table 1 
 
105. See generally CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & 
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1971) (providing series of updated texts, constitutional chronologies, 
introductory and comparative notes, and annotated bibliographies); Widner, supra note 16, at 1521–32 
(providing comprehensive description of variations in constitutional writing process and related 
outcomes); Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution, Case Files, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/data/cases.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (providing summaries of 
constitution-making processes of numerous countries). In the case of conflicting accounts, the 
promulgation process described in the constitution was controlling. 
106. Widner, supra note 16, at 1527–28. 
107. The role of executives in the promulgation process is relatively less clear. Various texts 
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provides descriptive statistics on the frequency of various methods. It shows that 
some form of referendum is more frequent than either constituent assembly or 
legislative methods of constitutional promulgation. There is also a strong trend 
toward public referendum as a method of constitutional approval. Figure 2 
indicates that over forty percent of constitutions currently in force have been 
adopted using some form of public referendum. 
 
Table 1. Frequency of Selected Promulgation Methods (N=413) 
 
Promulgation Method Number Frequency 
Constituent Assembly Approval 59 14% 
Constituent Assembly Approval and Executive Action 35 8% 
Legislative Approval 57 14% 
Legislative Approval and Executive Action 59 14% 
People via Referendum (singly and jointly with other 
actors) 
95 23% 
Other 108 27% 
 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of Constitutions in Force That  
Provide for Public Ratification 































describe the executive as needing to “proclaim,” “enact,” “sign,” “ratify,” “approve,” or “promulgate” 
the constitution. It is not always obvious how ceremonious these actions are or if the executive is a 
legitimate veto player in the approval process. Rather than attempt to parse out the “true” meaning of 
these provisions, a broad, inclusive rule for the role of the executive is adopted. Any mention of the 
executive in the process is sufficient to warrant a coding of “executive action.” 
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B. Does Participation Matter? 
Public approval forms a “downstream constraint” that designers must 
consider in selecting the substantive provisions of the constitution.108 We should 
thus expect that constitutions that face popular scrutiny at the polls will differ 
from those constitutions not similarly situated. We speculate that a referendum-
based promulgation process is more likely to produce constitutions with more 
public involvement in the ongoing operation of their government. To secure 
public approval, designers will likely have to produce more inclusive documents. 
In short, such constitutions will grant more “power to the people” than would 
otherwise be the case. 
“Power to the people” can be conceptualized in two dimensions. The first is 
in the opportunity for the public to participate in the selection and removal of 
public officials. The second dimension relates to the ability of the public to 
participate directly in the law-making or constitutional amendment process. The 
general expectation is that constitutional provisions relating to each of these 
aspects of popular participation are more likely to result from a referendum-
based process than from one that is not. 
In terms of public involvement in selection and removal of public officials, 
the CCP survey instrument considers the role of the public in the selection 
process for six public offices: the office of head of state, head of government, 
deputy executive, national legislators, subsidiary legislators, and municipal 
officials. We expect that more of these offices will be elective under a 
referendum constraint in order to induce a positive endorsement by the people 
of the proposed constitution. Table 2 provides the patterns for referenda and the 
number of these offices that are elective. A simple t-test (p<.0006) confirms that 
the mean number of elected executives is higher for constitutions involving a 
referendum (mean=2.26) than those without a referendum (mean=1.8). 
 
Table 2. Number of Elective Offices and  











0 45 2 4.44% 
1 113 16 14.16% 
2 132 44 33.33% 
3 81 25 30.9% 
4 36 4 11.1% 
5 6 4 66.6% 
 
 
108. Elster, supra note 23, at 374 (noting that knowledge of ratifying body’s preferences will act 
as constraint on what constitution drafters propose). 
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Conversely, where executives dominate the constitutional promulgation 
process we would expect that election would be less frequent. This is consistent 
with the idea of institutional self-interest in constitutional design.109 We find 
some support for these speculations. In this instance, executive-only processes 
generate, on average, 1.17 elective offices while all other processes generate an 
average of 1.99 elective offices, a difference that is statistically significant at 
p<.001. The office of head of state is elective in just over fourteen percent of the 
cases in which the executive is the sole promulgator. Constituent assemblies 
make the office elective in fifty-nine percent of cases but this number drops to 
forty-three percent when an executive is added to the process. As expected, 
referenda appear to increase the likelihood of this office being elective, as sixty 
percent of referendum-only processes contain this provision and sixty-six percent 
of promulgation processes that include a referendum provide it.110 Taken as a 
whole, there is reason to suspect that the presence of a referendum does indeed 
matter for the inclusion of this provision in constitutional texts, as does a role for 
the executive. 
An interesting case here is the experience of the Seychelles. In December of 
1991, President Albert René announced the return of multiparty elections 
beginning the following summer, when representatives to a constitutional 
commission would be chosen.111 This decision brought to an end the thirteen-
year monopoly of the Seychelles People’s Progressive Front (“SPPF”) on 
political power in the Seychelles archipelago.112 With just over fifty-eight percent 
of the vote in the July 1992 election, the SPPF gained fifteen seats on the 
commission to just eight for the main opposition party, the Seychelles 
Democratic Party (“SDP”).113 Sessions were closed and there is evidence that 
René considered the drafting process to be mostly a party matter.114 There was 
also resistance from the SDP to what they considered provisions designed to 
enhance presidential authority.115 The final draft, which was subject to a 
referendum, provided for elections to the National Assembly.116 Critics, 
however, led by the SDP, complained that the electoral formula was stacked in 
the president’s favor to guarantee him a legislative majority; more than one-third 
of legislative seats were to be allocated in proportion to the presidential vote 
 
109. Elster, supra note 23, at 380–81 (defining operation of institutional interest as situation in 
which body involved in constitution-making process creates important role for itself, and noting 
tenuous distinction between personal and institutional interests when executive is involved in process). 
110. Interestingly, promulgation by referenda combined with executive action yields an elective 
head of state in seventy-eight percent of cases. This is the only method in which the inclusion of the 
executive as an actor in the process does not decrease the frequency of the office being elective. 
111. John Hatchard, Re-establishing a Multi-Party State: Some Constitutional Lessons from the 
Seychelles, 31 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 601, 602 (1993). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 604. 
114. Id. at 605. 
115. Id. at 606; Jean R. Tartter, Seychelles: A Country Study, in INDIAN OCEAN: FIVE ISLAND 
COUNTRIES 199 (Helen C. Metz ed., 1995). 
116. Hatchard, supra note 111, at 606–08. 
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share.117 The SDP actively campaigned against adoption of the constitution in 
the November referendum, primarily on the grounds that it was undemocratic 
and would only perpetuate the power of the president and the SPPF.118 In other 
words, critics charged that the democratic features of the text were a sham. 
Following rejection of the draft constitution by more than forty percent of the 
voters, the commission was reconstituted, this time with the participation of the 
SDP.119 Proceedings were more open, with live television coverage permitted 
and interest groups able to put forward proposals.120 The revised draft submitted 
to voters in June 1993 contained a new electoral formula that divorced the 
proportion of legislative seats from the results of the presidential election.121 
With the unanimous support of the SPPF and the SDP, this version of the draft 
constitution was approved by more than seventy percent of voters and adopted 
that year.122 While hardly conclusive, the constitution-drafting process in the 
Seychelles is evidence that the referendum constraint can be binding; ratification 
can be more than a rubber stamp for the regime and citizens are capable of 
critical evaluation of a proposed text. 
The second dimension of “power to the people” relates to the ability of the 
public to participate directly in the law-making process. We examine this issue 
using CCP data on popular initiatives and referenda in the ordinary, 
nonconstitutional setting. “Initiatives” refer to laws that are proposed by 
members of the public and approved by them. “Referenda” refers to direct 
public approval of legislation that may be proposed by other actors. Table 3 
reports patterns for the number of direct democracy provisions, organized by 
whether the constitution is adopted by ratification referendum.  
We do not observe significant patterns in our data with regard to initiative. 
Of our 413 cases, 53 provide this power to individuals under varying conditions. 
Constitutions promulgated via referendum are no more likely to include the 
power of initiative (seventeen percent of such constitutions do so) than are 
constitutions promulgated by a constituent assembly (nineteen percent) or 
legislative processes (eighteen percent). 
Not surprisingly, a ratification referendum is positively correlated with the 
inclusion of the referendum instrument in a constitution (r=.47). Eighty-seven 
percent of cases requiring promulgation by referendum include a referendum 
provision in the text as compared to only forty-five percent of texts in the 
sample.123 Of the remaining promulgation processes, only legislative ones 
provide for referenda in more than half of the cases (thirty out of fifty-seven). 
 
117. Id. at 607–08 (noting formula for composition of legislature, one of several objectionable 
features of 1992 draft). 
118. Id. at 605–06. 
119. Id. at 606. 
120. Tartter, supra note 115, at 240. 
121. Hatchard, supra note 111, at 608 (stating changes to formula of legislature composition are 
among several positive modifications made to 1993 constitution). 
122. Id. at 606. 
123. Once again, the difference is significant (p<.001). 
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Legislative-executive and constituent-assembly-executive processes provide for 
referenda about one-third of the time and executive-only processes do so in only 
eight percent of cases. 
 
Table 3. Direct Democracy Provisions  
and the Presence of a Ratification Referendum 
 







Percentage of Cases 
with Referendum 
0 204 9 4% 
1 78 18 23% 
2 91 50 55% 
3 19 8 42% 
4 21 10 48% 
 
In sum, public approval of constitutional texts is associated with a different 
set of governance institutions than found in other constitutions. Public approval 
is associated with higher numbers of elective offices and greater use of referenda 
in ongoing governance. We do not, however, find that there is significantly 
greater likelihood of public initiative in such constitutions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This essay has explored the theoretical and empirical relationships among 
public participation, constitutions, and democracy. We found a broad consensus 
in the literature about the importance of public involvement as well as an 
apparent trend in practice.125 Yet many of the assumptions of proponents of 
participation remain untested, and the precise relationships between 
participation and desirable outcomes of interest remain underspecified. Scholars 
have been far better at generating hypotheses than testing them. Individual case 
studies have provided some insights, but large-n work has been hindered by a 
lack of data and a need for conceptual refinement. 
We have demonstrated some preliminary associations between the method 
of constitutional promulgation and the contents of the resulting document. We 
find some support for the hypothesis that participatory constitutions are 
systematically different from those adopted through other methods, and are 
more likely to include an expansive role for the public in ongoing governance.126 
 
124. This is a cumulative count of legislative initiatives, referenda, citizen involvement in 
proposing constitutional amendments, and citizen approval of constitutional amendments. 
125. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text for a discussion of widespread support for 
public involvement in constitution promulgation. 
126. See supra Part IV for an analysis of evidence supporting the existence of the relationship 
between the ratification process and emerging constitution. 
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To be sure, we are aware that any association between promulgation and 
participatory governance might also be explained as resulting from selection 
bias. That is, there may be a missing, unobserved variable that is causing 
designers to select more public involvement in both ratification and in the 
ongoing processes of democratic governance. One might expect that democratic 
political cultures would select both constitutional processes and constitutional 
provisions to maximize participation. Even if this is true, however, the observed 
correlation suggests that there is a relationship deserving recognition and further 
exploration. 
Further research on the gamut of sometimes-contradictory hypotheses 
described earlier is needed before we can confidently recommend participatory 
referenda in constitution making as a solution to normative problems.127 We also 
recognize that ratification is only one of many dimensions related to 
constitutional drafting that might be normatively valuable. Still, these 
preliminary results do suggest that participation may have some of the positive 
benefits that scholars have identified. 
 
127. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contradictory 
hypotheses regarding the effect of public participation on the constitution-making process. 
